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The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation
Franz Dietrich and Christian List1
(10/2005)
All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected
propositions have one of two restrictions: they either use a controversial system-
aticity condition or apply only to special agendas of propositions with rich logical
connections. An important open question is whether judgment aggregation faces
any serious impossibilities without these restrictions. Here we prove the first im-
possibility theorem without systematicity that applies to all standard agendas: there
exists no judgment aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality,
anonymity and a new condition called unbiasedness. For many agendas, anonymity
can be weakened. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented
in the judgment aggregation model, our result implies that every unbiased social
welfare function with universal domain depends only on a single individual.
Keywords: judgment aggregation, logic, impossibility, May’s neutrality
1 Introduction
In this paper, we prove a new impossibility theorem on the aggregation of indi-
vidual judgments (acceptance or rejection) on logically connected propositions
into collective judgments on these propositions. Judgment aggregation can rep-
resent many realistic collective decision problems due to the flexible notion of
a proposition. For example, the propositions could be the following:
a: "We can afford a budget deficit."
a→ b: "If we can afford a budget deficit, then we should increase spending
on education."
b: "We should increase spending on education."
The interest in judgment aggregation was sparked by the observation that
majority voting on logically connected propositions does not guarantee rational
(i.e. complete and consistent) collective judgments. In our example, if individ-
ual judgments are as in Table 1, then a majority accepts a, a majority accepts
a → b, and yet a majority rejects b. This problem has become known as the
"discursive paradox" (Pettit 2001).
Although there are parallels between judgment aggregation and the more
familiar problem of preference aggregation in Condorcet’s and Arrow’s tradi-
tion, judgment aggregation can be shown to generalize preference aggregation2
1F. Dietrich, Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box
616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands; C. List, Deptartment of Government, London
School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, U.K.
2If we express preference relations as binary ranking propositions in predicate logic (of
the form xPy), then preference aggregation becomes a special case of judgment aggregation
(List and Pettit 2004; Dietrich and List 2005), as illustrated in section 6 below. For a related
discussion, see Dokow and Holzman (2005).
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a a→ b b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A discursive paradox
and faces some important additional complexities. A basic fact about Arrowian
preference aggregation is that whenever the agenda — the set of alternatives un-
der consideration — is such that majority voting generates irrational collective
preferences for some profiles of individual preferences (i.e. when the agenda
contains three or more alternatives), then so does any preference aggregation
rule satisfying certain conditions:3 Arrow’s impossibility theorem. No such fact
holds for judgment aggregation. Even if the agenda — the set of propositions
under consideration — is such that majority voting generates irrational collective
judgments for some profiles of individual judgments (i.e. if the agenda has a
minimal inconsistent subset of size three or more), there may still exist other
judgment aggregation rules that satisfy the exact counterparts of Arrow’s condi-
tions and yet guarantee collective rationality; an impossibility result analogous
to Arrow’s theorem need not apply. The agenda in our example above and
many other agendas are of this kind. Neither the size of the agenda nor the size
of its largest minimal inconsistent subset (which determines whether majority
judgments can be irrational) determines whether or not a more general impos-
sibility result applies. The logical interconnections between the propositions
in the agenda matter in a surprisingly complex way. The recent literature on
judgment aggregation has explored this complexity.
List and Pettit (2002) proved a first impossibility theorem on judgment
aggregation, strengthened by Pauly and van Hees (2005), that makes a rela-
tively unrestrictive assumption on the agenda, but imposes a strong condition
of systematicity on the aggregation rule. Systematicity is the conjunction of
an Arrow-inspired independence condition (requiring propositionwise aggrega-
tion) and a neutrality condition (requiring equal treatment of all propositions).
Thus the price for the theorem’s weak agenda assumption is the strength of its
systematicity condition on an aggregation rule.
In response to this problem, several authors have proved impossibility theo-
rems in which systematicity is weakened to independence (Pauly and van Hees
2005; Dietrich 2005; van Hees 2004; Gärdenfors 2005; Nehring and Puppe 2005;
Dietrich and List 2005; Dokow and Holzman 2005; Mongin 2005). But these
results make more restrictive assumptions on the agenda, notably ones that
are violated in many standard examples of judgment aggregation, such as the
example above. (They also require an additional responsiveness, unanimity or
3Universal domain, the weak Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and
non-dictatorship.
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monotonicity condition.)
In an important recent contribution, Dokow and Holzman (2005) have iden-
tified an agenda assumption that (in standard logics) is necessary and sufficient
for an impossibility result with independence (together with a unanimity condi-
tion). This agenda assumption is much stronger than a necessary and sufficient
assumption for an impossibility result with systematicity (Dietrich and List
2005) and is also violated in the example above.
Thus an important question is still open: Is judgment aggregation free from
any compelling impossibility results unless we consider special agendas with rich
connections between propositions or impose the strong condition of systematic-
ity? Here we prove the first impossibility result that applies to all standard
agendas in the literature and yet relaxes systematicity to a weaker condition
called unbiasedness. Our unbiasedness condition is inspired by May’s (1952)
condition of neutrality in a single binary choice and requires an equal treat-
ment of each proposition and its negation, but not of different propositions.4
Specifically, under our weak agenda assumption, there exists no judgment ag-
gregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and
unbiasedness. For many standard agendas, anonymity can be further weakened
to the condition that the collective judgment set depends not only on a single
individual. We also identify the weakest (i.e. necessary and sufficient) agenda
assumption for which our impossibility result holds.
To illustrate the generality of our result, we show that, if we represent (strict)
preference aggregation in the judgment aggregation model, our result implies
that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain depends only
on a single individual. Moreover, unlike standard impossibility results on pref-
erence aggregation, our result continues to apply even if we consider the aggre-
gation of merely acyclical, as opposed to fully rational, preferences. Finally, it is
easy to see that our result also applies to Wilson’s (1975) model of the aggrega-
tion of binary evaluations, as recently revisited by Dokow and Holzman (2005).
Throughout this paper we adopt Dietrich’s (2004) general logics framework.
2 Definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a group of individuals (n ≥ 2) required to make
collective judgments on logically connected propositions.
A logic (with negation symbol ¬) consists of non-empty set L of formal
expressions (propositions) closed under negation (i.e. p ∈ L implies ¬p ∈ L)
and an entailment relation ², where, for each A ⊆ L and p ∈ L, A ² p is read as
"A entails p".5 A set A ⊆ L is inconsistent if A ² p and A ² ¬p for some p ∈ L,
and consistent otherwise; A ⊆ L is minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent
4Unbiasedness is by itself logically independent from independence, though jointly with
universal domain and collective rationality it implies independence.
5Formally, ² ⊆ P(L)× L.
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and every proper subset B ( A is consistent.
Our results hold for all logics with the following three minimal properties,
including standard propositional, predicate, modal and conditional logics:
(L1) For all p ∈ L, {p} ² p (self-entailment).
(L2) For all p ∈ L and A ⊆ B ⊆ L, if A ² p then B ² p (monotonicity).
(L3) ∅ is consistent, and each consistent set A ⊆ L has a consistent superset
B ⊆ L containing a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ L (completability).
For example, in propositional logic, L contains propositions such as a, b, a ∧ b,
a ∨ b, ¬(a → b), and ² satisfies {a, a → b} ² b, {a} ² a ∨ b, but not a ² a ∧ b.
Various realistic decision problems can be represented in our model, including
preference aggregation problems as illustrated below.
The agenda is a non-empty subset X ⊆ L, interpreted as the set of propo-
sitions on which judgments are to be made, where X is a union of proposition-
negation pairs {p,¬p} (with p not itself a negated proposition). We assume
that double negations cancel each other out, i.e. ¬¬p stands for p.6 In the
example above, the agenda is X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, a→ b,¬(a→ b)} in a standard
propositional (or a conditional) logic.
We call an agenda weakly connected ifX has a minimal inconsistent subset Y
of size at least three such that (Y \Z)∪{¬z : z ∈ Z} is consistent for some subset
Z ⊆ Y of even size. All standard agendas in the judgment aggregation literature
are weakly connected,7 including agendas representing preference aggregation
problems with three or more alternatives, as discussed below. In our example
above, take Y = {a, a → b,¬b} and Z = {a,¬b}. Below we consider an even
weaker agenda assumption.8
Each individual i’s judgment set is a subset Ai ⊆ X, where p ∈ Ai means
that individual i accepts proposition p. A judgment set Ai is rational if it is
(i) consistent as defined above, and (ii) complete in the sense that, for every
proposition p ∈ X, p ∈ Ai or ¬p ∈ Ai. A profile is an n-tuple (A1, . . . , An) of
individual judgment sets.
A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to each admissible
profile (A1, . . . , An) a collective judgment set F (A1, . . . , An) = A ⊆ X, where
p ∈ A means that the group accepts proposition p. The set of admissible
profiles is denoted Domain(F ). An example is majority voting, where, for each
(A1, ..., An), F (A1, ..., An) = {p ∈ X : |{i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}| > |{i ∈ N : p /∈ Ai}|}.
6More precisely, when we use the negation symbol ¬ hereafter, we mean a modified nega-
tion symbol ∼, where ∼ p := ¬p if p is unnegated and ∼ p := q if p = ¬q for some q.
7The notorious exception is X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, a ↔ b,¬(a ↔ b)}, where ↔ is the mate-
rial biconditional. However, for a strict or subjunctive biconditional in standard modal or
conditional logics, X is weakly connected.
8List and Pettit’s (2002) agenda assumption is also a special case of weak connectedness:
here the agenda contains two or more atomic propositions, their conjunction (or disjunction
or material implication) and the negations of these propositions.
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3 The theorem
For our result, we impose four conditions on an aggregation rule (below we relax
anonymity).
Universal domain. Domain(F ) is the set of all possible profiles of rational
individual judgment sets.
Collective rationality. F (A1, . . . , An) is rational for every profile (A1, . . . , An)
∈ Domain(F ).
Anonymity. For any profile (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Domain(F ) and any permutation
σ : N → N , F (A1, . . . , An) = F (Aσ(1), . . . , Aσ(n)).
Unbiasedness. For any proposition p ∈ X and profiles (A1, . . . , An), (A∗1, . . . ,
A∗n) ∈ Domain(F ), if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai if and only if ¬p ∈ A∗i ] then
[p ∈ F (A1, . . . , An) if and only if ¬p ∈ F (A∗1, . . . , A∗n)].9
While the first three conditions are standard conditions, unbiasedness is a
new condition inspired by May’s (1952) condition of neutrality. Unbiasedness
requires an equal treatment of each proposition p ∈ X and its negation ¬p,
regardless of other judgments. If we interpret a judgment aggregation problem
as consisting of multiple binary decisions between proposition-negation pairs,
then unbiasedness can be seen as the application of May’s neutrality condition
to each such pair. Unbiasedness replaces List and Pettit’s (2002) stronger con-
dition of systematicity, which requires an aggregation rule to be neutral between
any two propositions p, q ∈ X, as in the case of majority voting, symmetrical
supermajority rules, dictatorships or inverse dictatorships.10
Unlike systematicity, unbiasedness permits aggregation rules that apply dif-
ferent decision criteria to different propositions but the same criterion to each
proposition p ∈ X and its negation ¬p, such as majority voting on some pairs
p,¬p ∈ X, different dictatorships or inverse dictatorships on other pairs, sym-
metrical committee rules on even other pairs, erratic rules (such as ones making
each minority decisive) on some pairs etc. Unbiasedness also differs from a
global neutrality condition based on a permutation π : X → X of the agenda
(e.g. van Hees 2004). It is by itself logically independent from independence;
but, jointly with universal domain and collective rationality, it implies indepen-
dence, as shown below. By contrast, systematicity implies both independence
and global neutrality.
We can now state our main result.
9All our results also hold for a modified definition of unbiasedness, obtained by substituting
"p /∈ Ai" for "¬p ∈ Ai" and "p /∈ F (A1, ..., An)" for "¬p ∈ F (A1, ..., An)". The two definitions
are equivalent under universal domain and collective rationality.
10Formally, systematicity requires that, for any propositions p, q ∈ X and profiles
(A1, . . . , An), (A
∗
1, . . . , A
∗
n) ∈ Domain(F ), if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai if and only if
q ∈ A∗i ] then [p ∈ F (A1, . . . , An) if and only if q ∈ F (A∗1, . . . , A∗n)].
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Theorem 1. For a weakly connected agenda, there exists no aggregation rule
satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and unbiasedness.
Note that no responsiveness, unanimity or monotonicity condition is needed.
Theorem 1 continues to hold if unbiasedness is restricted to the propositions in
Y , as defined in weak connectedness. Below we identify the weakest agenda
assumption for which the result holds.
Our proof also establishes two refinements. Call individual i ∈ N dicta-
torial for p (respectively, inversely dictatorial for p) if, for any (A1, ..., An) ∈
Domain(F ), p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) if and only if p ∈ Ai (respectively, if and only if
p /∈ Ai).
Refinement 1. For a weakly connected agenda, if an aggregation rule satisfies
universal domain, collective rationality and unbiasedness, then there exists a
proposition p ∈ X for which some individual i ∈ N is (possibly inversely)
dictatorial.
Call an agenda X non-separable if it cannot be partitioned into two logically
independent (sub)agendas X1 and X2, each containing at least one contingent
proposition (where X1 and X2 are logically independent if B1 ∪B2 is consistent
for any consistent subsets B1 ⊆ X1 and B2 ⊆ X2, and proposition p ∈ L is
contingent if {p} and {¬p} are consistent). The agenda in our example above
and many other agendas are non-separable.
Refinement 2. For a weakly connected and non-separable agenda (in a com-
pact logic), if an aggregation rule satisfies universal domain, collective rational-
ity and unbiasedness, then there exists some individual i ∈ N such that, for
every proposition p ∈ X, i is (possibly inversely) dictatorial for p (in particular,
the collective judgment set depends only on individual i).
A disanalogy between our new result and earlier impossibility results on
systematicity is that in those earlier results anonymity can be weakened to non-
dictatorship and/or non-inverse-dictatorship (Pauly and van Hees 2005; Dietrich
2004; Dietrich and List 2005), while in the present result it cannot be weakened
as much. But Refinement 2 shows that, for the large class of weakly connected
and non-separable agendas, it can be weakened to the compelling condition that
the collective judgment set depends not only on a single individual.
4 The proof
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on three lemmas. The first lemma requires
the definition of independence.
Independence. For any proposition p ∈ X and profiles (A1, . . . , An), (A∗1, . . . ,
A∗n) ∈ Domain(F ), if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai if and only if p ∈ A∗i ] then
[p ∈ F (A1, . . . , An) if and only if p ∈ F (A∗1, . . . , A∗n)].
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Lemma 1. If an aggregation rule satisfies universal domain, collective ratio-
nality and unbiasedness, then it also satisfies independence.
Proof. Let F be as specified. Consider any p ∈ X and any profiles (A1, ..., An),
(A∗1, ..., A
∗
n) ∈ Domain(F ) in which the same set of individuals C ⊆ N accepts
p. We show that p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) if and only if p ∈ F (A∗1, ..., A∗n), as required
by independence. By collective rationality, if p is a tautology (i.e. {¬p} is
inconsistent), p is contained in both F (A1, ..., An) and F (A∗1, ..., A
∗
n); if p is a
contradiction (i.e. {p} is inconsistent), p is contained in neither of F (A1, ..., An)
and F (A∗1, ..., A
∗
n). Now suppose p is contingent. Then ¬p is also contingent.
By universal domain, there exists a profile (A01, ..., A
0
n) ∈ Domain(F ) such that
exactly the individuals in C accept ¬p. By unbiasedness, p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) is
equivalent to ¬p ∈ F (A01, ..., A0n), which, again by unbiasedness, is equivalent to
p ∈ F (A∗1, ..., A∗n). ¥
Call a coalition C ⊆ N winning for p ∈ X (under F ) if p ∈ F (A1, ..., An)
for every profile (A1, ..., An) ∈ Domain(F ) with {i : p ∈ Ai} = C. If an
aggregation rule F satisfies independence, then it is uniquely determined by its
winning coalitions, because
F (A1, ..., An) = {p ∈ X : {i : p ∈ Ai} ∈ Cp} for all (A1, ..., An) ∈ Domain(F ),
where, for each p ∈ X, Cp denotes the set of winning coalitions for p.
The second lemma requires the definition of the unanimity principle.
Unanimity principle. N is a winning coalition for each p ∈ X.
Lemma 2. Suppose F satisfies universal domain, collective rationality and
unbiasedness, and define, for each p ∈ X,
bp := ½ p if N is a winning coalition for p,¬p if N is not a winning coalition for p.
Then:
(a) For any p ∈ X, c¬p = ¬bp and bbp = p.
(b) For any A ⊆ X, A is consistent if and only if {bp : p ∈ A} is consistent.
(c) The aggregation rule bF with universal domain defined by
bF (A1, ..., An) := {bp : p ∈ F (A1, ..., An)}
satisfies collective rationality, unbiasedness and the unanimity principle.
(d) For any p ∈ X, either Cp = bCp or Cp = {C ⊆ N : C /∈ bCp}, where Cp andbCp denote the set of winning coalitions for p under F and under bF , respectively.
Proof. Let F be as specified.
(a) Suppose p ∈ X. N is winning for p if and only if N is winning for ¬p; if p
is contingent this follows easily from unbiasedness (see also part (a) of Lemma
7
3); if p is not contingent it holds because N is winning for every tautology
and (vacuously) for every contradiction. As N is winning for p if and only if
p is winning for ¬p, we have bp = p if and only if c¬p = ¬p, whence c¬p = ¬bp.
Moreover, if bp = p then bbp = bp = p, and if bp = ¬p then bbp = c¬p = ¬bp = ¬¬p = p.
(b) LetA ⊆ X. By (a) it is sufficient to show one direction of the implication.
Let A be consistent. Then there exists a complete and consistent judgment set
B ⊆ X such that A ⊆ B. For each p ∈ A, F (B, ..., B) contains bp because:
- if N ∈ Cp then bp = p ∈ F (B, ..., B);
- if N /∈ Cp then p /∈ F (B, ..., B), and so bp = ¬p ∈ F (B, ..., B).
By {bp : p ∈ A} ⊆ F (B, ..., B), {bp : p ∈ A} is consistent.
(c) bF satisfies collective rationality: for any (A1, ..., An) ∈ Domain( bF ),bF (A1, ..., An) is
- consistent by (b) and the consistency of F (A1, ..., An);
- complete as, for any p ∈ X, if p /∈ bF (A1, ..., An) then bp /∈ F (A1, ..., An) by
p = bbp, hence ¬bp ∈ F (A1, ..., An), and so bF (A1, ..., An) contains c¬bp = c¬p = ¬p.bF satisfies the unanimity principle: for any p ∈ X and any (A1, ..., An) ∈
Domain( bF ) with p ∈ Ai for all individuals i,
- if p ∈ F (A1, ..., An), thenN is a winning coalition for p under F (by Lemma
1), hence bp = p, and so p ∈ bF (A1, ..., An);
- if p /∈ F (A1, ..., An), then ¬p ∈ F (A1, ..., An), hence c¬p ∈ bF (A1, ..., An),
where c¬p = ¬bp = ¬¬p = p (since bp = ¬p).
To show that bF satisfies unbiasedness, consider any p ∈ X and (A1, ..., An),
(A∗1, ..., A
∗
n) ∈ Domain( bF ) such that p ∈ Ai if and only if ¬p ∈ A∗i . Then
(*) bp ∈ Ai if and only if ¬bp ∈ A∗i . Now p ∈ bF (A1, ..., An) is equivalent tobp ∈ F (A1, ..., An), by definition of bF and as p = bbp. The latter is equivalent to
¬bp ∈ F (A∗1, ..., A∗n), by (*) and as F satisfies unbiasedness. This, in turn, is
equivalent to c¬bp ∈ bF (A∗1, ..., A∗n) by definition of bF , i.e. to ¬p ∈ bF (A∗1, ..., A∗n)
as c¬bp = c¬p = ¬p by part (a).
(d) Let p, Cp and bCp be as specified. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 : bp = p. Then Cp = bCp, because, for any profile (A1, ..., An) in the
universal domain, p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) is equivalent to bp ∈ bF (A1, ..., An) (using
that bbp = p), i.e. to p ∈ bF (A1, ..., An).
Case 2 : bp = ¬p. To show that Cp = {C ⊆ N : C /∈ bCp}, we consider
any C ⊆ N , and prove that C ∈ Cp is equivalent to C /∈ bCp. By bp = ¬p, p is
contingent, and so there exists a profile (A1, ..., An) in the universal domain such
that {i : p ∈ Ai} = C. Now C ∈ Cp is equivalent to p ∈ F (A1, ..., An), which is
equivalent to bp ∈ bF (A1, ..., An) (as in case 1), i.e. to ¬p ∈ bF (A1, ..., An), hence
to p /∈ bF (A1, ..., An), and so to C /∈ bCp, as desired. ¥
Call propositions p, q ∈ X connected (in X) if there exist p∗ ∈ {p,¬p} and
q∗ ∈ {q,¬q} such that {p∗, q∗} ∪ Y is inconsistent for some Y ⊆ X consistent
with p∗ and with q∗.
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Lemma 3. Suppose F satisfies collective rationality, universal domain and
unbiasedness, and, for any p ∈ X, let Cp be the set of winning coalitions for p.
Then:
(a) If p ∈ X is contingent, then Cp = C¬p, and, for any C ⊆ N , C ∈ Cp if
and only if N\C /∈ Cp.
(b) If p, q ∈ X are connected and F satisfies the unanimity principle, Cp = Cq
(c) If p, q ∈ X are connected, either Cp = Cq or Cp = {C ⊆ N : C /∈ Cq}.
Proof. Let F be as specified. By Lemma 1, F satisfies independence.
(a) Let p ∈ X be contingent. To show Cp = C¬p, consider any C ⊆ N ,
and let us prove that C ∈ Cp if and only if C ∈ C¬p. As p is contingent,
there exist profiles (A1, ..., An), (A∗1, ..., A
∗
n) ∈ Domain(F ) such that C = {i :
p ∈ Ai} = {i : ¬p ∈ A∗i }. By unbiasedness, p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) if and only if
¬p ∈ F (A∗1, ..., A∗n), whence {i : p ∈ Ai} ∈ Cp if and only if {i : ¬p ∈ A∗i} ∈ C¬p,
i.e. C ∈ Cp if and only if C ∈ C¬p.
To prove the second part of (a), let C ⊆ N again. As p is contingent, there
exists a profile (A1, ..., An) ∈ Domain(F ) such that C = {i : p ∈ Ai}, hence
N\C = {i : ¬p ∈ Ai}. Now C ∈ Cp is equivalent to p ∈ F (A1, ..., An), hence to
¬p /∈ F (A1, ..., An), hence to N\C /∈ C¬p, hence to N\C /∈ Cp, as shown above.
(b) Suppose p, q ∈ X are connected and the unanimity principle holds. Then
there exist v ∈ {p,¬p} and w ∈ {q,¬q} and Y ⊆ X such that (i) each of {v}∪Y
and {w} ∪ Y is consistent, and (ii) {v, w} ∪ Y is inconsistent. It follows (using
L1-L3) that (iii) each of {v,¬w} ∪ Y and {¬v, w} ∪ Y is consistent. By (iii),
v and w are contingent. So, by part (a), it is sufficient to show that Cv = Cw.
We only show that Cv ⊆ Cw, as the converse inclusion is analogous. Suppose
C ∈ Cv. By (iii) there exists a profile (A1, ..., An) ∈ Domain(F ) such that
{v,¬w} ∪ Y ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ C and {¬v, w} ∪ Y ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ N\C. We
have v ∈ F (A1, ..., An) by C ∈ Cv, and Y ⊆ F (A1, ..., An) by N ∈ Cv. By
{v} ∪ Y ⊆ F (A1, ..., An) and (ii), w /∈ F (A1, ..., An). So N\C /∈ Cw, and hence
C ∈ Cw by part (a), as desired.
(c) Suppose p, q ∈ X are connected. Let bF and bCr, r ∈ X, be as defined
in Lemma 2. By Lemma 2, bF satisfies collective rationality, universal domain,
unbiasedness, and also the unanimity principle. So, by part (b), bCp = bCq. This
together with part (d) of Lemma 2 implies the claim. ¥
We can now prove Theorem 1. Let X be weakly connected, and let F satisfy
universal domain, collective rationality and unbiasedness. We show that F is
not anonymous. Let Y ⊆ X be as defined in weak connectedness, and let bF andbp (for any p ∈ X) be defined as in Lemma 2. By Lemma 2, bF satisfies collective
rationality, universal domain, unbiasedness and the unanimity principle; hencebF also satisfies independence by Lemma 1.
As bF satisfies independence, bF induces a unique aggregation rule F ∗ for the
subagenda X∗ := {p,¬p : p ∈ Y }; specifically, F ∗ is the aggregation rule for X∗
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with universal domain given by
F ∗(A1, ..., An) = bF (B1, ..., Bn) ∩X∗ for any (A1, ..., An) ∈ Domain(F ∗),
where (B1, ..., Bn) ∈ Domain( bF ) satisfies Bi ∩ X∗ = Ai for each i, and where
by independence F ∗(A1, ..., An) does not depend on the particular choice of
(B1, ..., Bn).
Claim 1. F ∗ satisfies collective rationality, the unanimity principle and
systematicity.
The rule F ∗ inherits collective rationality, the unanimity principle and un-
biasedness from bF , which has these properties by Lemma 2. So, by part (b) of
Lemma 3, as any two propositions in X∗ are connected, each proposition in X∗
has the same set of winning coalitions (under F ∗). So F ∗ is systematic.
Claim 2. F ∗ is dictatorial, say with dictator i.
This claim follows from claim 1 by applying Proposition 1 in Dietrich and
List (2005).
Claim 3. Under F , for each p ∈ X∗, i is (possibly inversely) dictatorial for
p. In particular, F violates anonymity, which completes the proof.
By Claim 2 and as F ∗ is the restriction of bF to X∗, i is under bF dictatorial
for each p ∈ X∗. So, by part (d) of Lemma 2, under F , for each p ∈ X∗, i is
possibly inversely dictatorial for p. ¥
Claim 3 actually establishes Refinement 1 above. Refinement 2 can be shown
by replacing in Claims 1 to 3 X∗ by X and F ∗ by bF , where the new Claim 1
still holds because, using Proposition 2 below, any two propositions in X are
still indirectly connected as defined below.
5 The weakest possible agenda assumption for
our result
We now identify the weakest agenda assumption for which our impossibility
result holds. Call propositions p, q ∈ X indirectly connected if there exist
p1, ..., pk ∈ X with p1 = p and pk = q such that, for each t ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}, pt
and pt+1 are connected (as defined above).
Theorem 1 and Refinements 1 and 2 continue to hold if weak connectedness
is weakened to the assumption that (i) X has a minimal inconsistent subset Y
of size at least three, and (ii) X has a minimal inconsistent subset Y ∗ such that
(Y ∗\Z)∪{¬z : z ∈ Z} is consistent for some subset Z ⊆ Y ∗ of even size, where
(iii) some p ∈ Y is indirectly connected to some q ∈ Y ∗. If Y = Y ∗, this reduces
to the earlier definition of weak connectedness.11
11The conjunction of (i) and (ii) is the condition of minimal connectedness, the weak-
est agenda assumption for which an impossibility result with List and Pettit’s original four
conditions holds (Dietrich and List 2005).
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To see that our result continues to hold if weak connectedness is weakened
in this way, one needs to adapt the above proof by redefining the subagenda X∗
as {p,¬p : p ∈ Y } ∪ {p,¬p : p ∈ Y ∗} ∪ {pt,¬pt : t = 1, ..., k}, where p1, ..., pk is
a path indirectly connecting some p ∈ Y to some q ∈ Y ∗.
The conjunction of (i), (ii) and (iii) is not only sufficient, but also essentially
necessary for obtaining the impossibility result of Theorem 1.
Proposition 1. For a compact logic or a finite agenda, and n odd, if the
agenda violates (i), (ii) or (iii), then there exists an aggregation rule satisfying
universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and unbiasedness.
Proof. Suppose not all of (i)-(iii) hold. Let X1 be the set of all p ∈ X that
either belong to a set Y ∗ ⊆ X of the type in (ii) or are indirectly connected
to an element of such a set. Further, define X2 := X\X1. (X1 or X2 can be
empty.) By assumption, (*) X1 has no subset Y of the type in (i), and (**)
X2 has no subset Y ∗ of the type in (ii).
Claim: X1 and X2 are logically independent.
Suppose for a contradiction that B1 ⊆ X1 and B2 ⊆ X2 are each consistent
but that B1 ∪ B2 is inconsistent. As X is finite or the logic is compact, there
exists a minimal inconsistent subset B ⊆ B1 ∪ B2. We have neither B ⊆ B1
nor B ⊆ B2, since otherwise B would be consistent. So there exist r ∈ B ∩X1
and s ∈ B ∩ X2. r and s are connected, because, putting Y := B\{r, s},
{r, s}∪Y = B is inconsistent, but each of {r}∪Y = B\{s} and {s}∪Y = B\{r}
is consistent by B’s minimal inconsistency. This contradiction proves the claim.
Define the rule F with universal domain by F (A1, ..., An) := B1∪B2, where
B1 : = {p ∈ X1 : |{i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}| > |{i ∈ N : p /∈ Ai}|},
B2 : = {p ∈ X2 : |{i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}| is odd}.
F is unbiased and anonymous, and the output B1 ∪B2 is complete as n is odd.
To complete the proof, we show that B1 ∪ B2 is consistent. B1 is consistent
by (*) and as X is finite or the logic compact. B2 is is consistent by (**) (see
Dokow and Holzman (2005), from where we had the insight for how to define
F on X2). So, by the above claim, B1 ∪B2 is consistent. ¥
Condition (iii) holds in particular if the agenda is indirectly connected in the
sense that any contingent propositions p, q ∈ X are indirectly connected. To
show that indirect connectedness of the agenda, although stronger than (iii), is
still undemanding, we prove that, under standard assumptions, it is equivalent
to non-separability, as defined above. Moreover, Refinement 2 continues to hold
if non-separability is replaced with indirect connectedness and the compactness
requirement is dropped.
Proposition 2. For any agenda, indirect connectedness implies non-separability,
and the two are equivalent if the agenda is finite or the logic compact.
11
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the claim for X0 := {p ∈ X : p contingent},
because X is indirectly connected if and only if X0 is, and X is non-separable
if and only if X0 is.
1. First assume X0 is separable. Then there is a partition of X into logically
independent subagendas X1, X2. Consider any p ∈ X1 and q ∈ X2. We show
that p and q are not indirectly connected. Suppose for a contradiction that
p1, ..., pm ∈ X (m ≥ 1) are such that p = p1, q = pm, and pt and pt+1 are
connected for any t ∈ {1, ...,m − 1}. As p1 ∈ X1 and pm ∈ X2, there must
be a t ∈ {1, ...,m − 1} such that pt ∈ X1 and pt+1 ∈ X2. As pt and pt+1
are connected, there are p∗t ∈ {pt,¬pt}, p∗t+1 ∈ {pt+1,¬pt+1} and Y ⊆ X such
that (i) {p∗t , p∗t+1} ∪ Y is inconsistent and (ii) each of {p∗t} ∪ Y and {p∗t+1} ∪ Y
is consistent. By (ii), each of the sets B1 := ({p∗t} ∪ Y ) ∩ X1 and B1 :=
({p∗t+1} ∪ Y ) ∩ X2 is consistent. So B1 ∪ B2 is consistent, as X1 and X2 are
logically independent. But
B1 ∪B2 = [({p∗t} ∪ Y ) ∩X1] ∪ [({p∗t+1} ∪ Y ) ∩X2]
= [({p∗t , p∗t+1} ∪ Y ) ∩X1] ∪ [({p∗t , p∗t+1} ∪ Y ) ∩X2]
= ({p∗t , p∗t+1} ∪ Y ) ∩ [X1 ∪X2] = {p∗t , p∗t+1} ∪ Y,
which is inconsistent by (ii), a contradiction.
2. Now supposeX is finite or the logic is compact, and letX be not indirectly
connected. We show that X is separable. By assumption, there exist p, q ∈ X
that are not indirectly connected. Define X1 := {r ∈ X : p and r are indirectly
connected} and X2 := X\X1. Since p is indirectly connected to itself (as p is
contingent), p ∈ X1. Further, q ∈ X2. So each of X1 and X2 is non-empty.
Further, each of X1 and X2 is closed under negation. If follows that X1 and X2
are subagendas of X. Finally, it can be shown (see the "claim" in the proof of
Proposition 1) that X1 and X2 are logically independent, as desired. ¥
6 An illustration
To illustrate the generality of our result, we apply Theorem 1 to the aggregation
of (strict) preferences, embedded into the judgment aggregation model. We
consider the agenda X = {xPy,¬xPy ∈ L : x, y ∈ K with x 6= y}, where (i)
L is a predicate logic for representing preferences, with a two-place predicate
P (representing strict preference) and a set of constants K = {x, y, z, ...} with
|K| ≥ 3 (representing alternatives), and (ii) A ² p if and only if A∪Z entails p
in the standard sense of predicate logic, with Z defined as the set of rationality
conditions on strict preferences.12 (Details of the construction are given in
Dietrich and List 2005; see also List and Pettit 2004.)
12Formally, Z contains (∀v1)(∀v2)(v1Pv2 → ¬v2Pv1) (asymmetry),
(∀v1)(∀v2)(∀v3)((v1Pv2 ∧ v2Pv3) → v1Pv3) (transitivity), (∀v1)(∀v2)(¬ v1=v2 →
(v1Pv2 ∨ v2Pv1)) (connectedness) and, for each pair of distinct contants x, y ∈ K,
¬x=y.
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The agenda X thus defined is weakly connected and non-separable. Also,
each rational judgment set Ai ⊆ X uniquely represents a strict (i.e. asymmet-
ric, transitive and connected) preference relation Âi⊆ K ×K, where, for any
x, y ∈ K, xPy ∈ Ai if and only if x Âi y. For example, if K = {x, y, z},
the preference relation x Âi y Âi z is represented by the judgment set Ai =
{xPy, yPz, xPz,¬yPx,¬zPy,¬zPx}. Now a judgment aggregation rule sat-
isfying collective rationality uniquely represents a social welfare function with
strict preferences as input and output. Universal domain and anonymity be-
come equivalent to the equally named standard conditions on a social welfare
function, and unbiasedness, applied to a social welfare function, becomes the
condition that, for any pair of alternatives x, y ∈ K and any two preference
profiles (Â1, ...,Ân), (Â∗1, ...,Â∗n), if [for all individuals i, x Âi y if and only if
y Â∗i x] then [x Â y if and only if y Â∗ x].
We can now state the corollary of Theorem 1 for strict preference aggrega-
tion, using Refinement 2: Every unbiased social welfare function with universal
domain depends only on a single individual. Again, no unanimity (Pareto)
condition is needed.
Although this result could also be obtained in standard social choice the-
ory (for example, via Wilson’s (1972) result on social choice without the Pareto
principle), the observation that it is a corollary of our new theorem on judgment
aggregation should illustrate the theorem’s generality. Interestingly, unlike Wil-
son’s and Arrow’s theorems, our result continues to hold even if the rationality
conditions on preferences are relaxed to acyclicity alone (giving up full transi-
tivity and connectedness). The reason is that the agenda X, as specified above,
remains weakly connected and non-separable in a modified predicate logic ob-
tained by weakening the conditions in the set Z above so as to capture acyclicity
alone.
7 Concluding remarks
In judgment aggregation, we face not only a logical trade-off between differ-
ent conditions on an aggregation rule (as in preference aggregation), but also
a logical trade-off between these conditions and the generality of the agendas
of propositions for which the aggregation rules in question are used. We have
proved the first impossibility theorem on judgment aggregation that applies to
all standard agendas in the literature and yet does not impose systematicity, a
condition often criticized as being too strong. Our weaker condition of unbiased-
ness allows the rule to treat different propositions differently, while preserving
neutrality between each proposition and its negation. Unbiasedness can be
seen as the application of a May-type neutrality condition to each proposition-
negation pair. Like May’s condition, unbiasedness is a plausible requirement in
many, but not all, aggregation problems.
Our result shows that, for all weakly connected agendas, unbiasedness is
13
inconsistent with anonymity (under universal domain and collective rationality);
no responsiveness, monotonicity or unanimity condition is needed for this result.
If the agenda is also non-separable or indirectly connected, as in our initial
example and in preference aggregation problems with three or more alternatives
(and in many other standard aggregation problems), unbiasedness implies that
the collective judgment set depends only on a single individual. Finally, we
have identified the weakest agenda assumption for which our result holds.
Our impossibility finding appears significant, as it implies that, in virtually
all realistic judgment aggregation problems, any aggregation rule with com-
monly accepted properties must favour some propositions over their negations.
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